Narco-Terrorism: The New Discovery of an Old Connection by Marshall, Donnie
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 35
Issue 3 Winter 2002 Article 9
Narco-Terrorism: The New Discovery of an Old
Connection
Donnie Marshall
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marshall, Donnie (2002) "Narco-Terrorism: The New Discovery of an Old Connection," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 35: Iss.
3, Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol35/iss3/9
Narco-Terrorism: The New Discovery of
an Old Connection
Donnie Marshallt
Newly focused attention on the connection between illegal drugs and ter-
rorism is both encouraging and frustrating. I was a thirty-year career Spe-
cial Agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and served my
last two years as the head of the agency. This attention is encouraging
because American people and policy makers finally seem to get the point
that there is a connection. I hope the public and our policy makers realize
this connection is significant, that the importance of this connection will
grow, and that we must respond to this connection if we are to succeed in
the war against global terrorism. Nonetheless, this new attention is frus-
trating because for some time we have known a drug-terror nexus exists.
Yet, we have been reluctant to treat drug organizations as terrorists, and
terrorist organizations as drug traffickers, sacrificing effectiveness in com-
bating narco-terrorism, in favor of bureaucratic compartmentalization of
these two intricately intertwined issues.
In order to understand today's situation, and how it developed, it is
essential to understand a bit about the history of international drug traf-
ficking over the past three decades. Until the early 1960s, the United
States was a relatively drug free society (at least when compared with the
United States of the late 1970s and beyond). Drug abuse in our country
had been at relatively low levels for several decades prior to the early
1960s. As drugs' popularity increased through the early 1960s, American
society simply did not understand the true dangers of drugs in our society.
As a result, many people in the United States believed the increased drug
use was inconsequential. Many people even referenced the 1936 movie
"Reefer Madness"1 to ridicule warnings against the dangers of drug abuse.
A significant portion of the public viewed the government's counter drug
programs with skepticism, apathy, and even outright hostility. The fact
that consequences of drug abuse - such as overdoses, lost economic pro-
ductivity, and drug related crime and violence - did not become highly
visible for several years reinforced public skepticism.
As the drug problem became endemic, law enforcement officials had a
better understanding of the crime itself and social consequences that
would eventually follow. However, even law enforcement officials did not
t Director, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2000-2001.
1. REEFER MADNESS (GH Films 1936). For information about the movie, see film
website at http://www.reefer-madness-movie.com (describing movie as "[a] propaganda
film from 1936 that has become a cult hit because of its dated outlook on marijuana
use ... focus[ing] on almost slapstick scenes of high school kids smoking pot . .
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fully recognize the huge potential impact on economics and terrorism that
the United States would face in later years as the international drug trade
grew and matured. In fact, law enforcement officials at that time did not
even identify the problem as a global criminal enterprise. Rather, law
enforcement officials treated the growing drug trade more as a problem of
small businesses and individual entrepreneurs. Law enforcement officials
perceived potential loose connections among small enterprises, but did not
tie them together into a worldwide criminal conspiracy, which we later
came to understand that it was. Consequently, most law enforcement
agencies worked on an isolated investigation, closed it out, and moved onto
another case, frequently without attempting to determine the actual extent
of connections between criminal organizations.
By the late 1970s, more and more observers recognized consequences
of the drug problem in the United States as drug abuse became epidemic;
more types of dangerous drugs were abused, and the illegal drug business
grew from cottage industries to huge, enormously wealthy international
syndicates. Consequences included massive drug violence, criminal turf
wars, and the deaths of innocent civilians caught in crossfire. Additional
consequences included rise in property crimes, deaths and injuries from
overdose, lost business productivity, rise in child neglect and abuse, the
birth of crack and heroin babies, and countless tragic wastes of individual
lives and potential.
In response, the country began to address the problem more aggres-
sively in the early 1980s, using a combination of education, prevention,
and treatment programs with heightened law enforcement. Support and
guidance came directly from the White House.2 Law enforcement officials
became much more effective with financial investigations, analyzing the
connections among criminal groups, constructing historical conspiracies,
examining documentary and computer records, and using sophisticated
intelligence analysis tools. By the early to mid-1990s, law enforcement offi-
cials had wiped out the huge Colombian cartels, eliminated the first wave
of Ecstacy, made LSD virtually disappear, had all but eliminated Southeast
Asian heroin from our streets, and reduced the availability and use of
methamphetamines. In the aggregate, combined measures worked so well
by the early 1990s, surveys showed there were roughly one-half the num-
ber of regular drug users from the peak of the drug epidemic in the late
1970s and early 1980s.
By the early to mid-1990s, there were only a couple of small problems
impeding our continued progress on the issue. First, with reductions in
drug abuse and its correlating crime and violence, many in the United
States mistakenly thought we had already won the day. High profile issues,
like the cocaine cowboys 3 and crack babies, were off the front pages and
2. See e.g., Debate Series, The War On Drugs: Fighting Crime or Wasting Time?, 38
Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1539 (2001) (discussing measures passed by Reagan and Bush
White Houses established to fight "War on Drugs").
3. Cocaine cowboy is a term used to describe young urban youths who ascended to
the status of rich gangsters by selling and trafficking drugs; named to capture "the auda-
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there were general declines in many types of drug related crime. The gen-
eral public and our elected national leadership relaxed. As former Clinton
drug czar Barry McCaffrey characterized it: "We took our eye off the ball."4
Drug abuse began to rise again. Second, by the mid 1990s, illegal drug
trafficking had become a highly organized, specialized, compartmental-
ized, and well-financed business that was much harder to attack. Criminal
organizations had specialists in drug transportation, smuggling, process-
ing, protection and enforcement services, retailing, money laundering, and
even marketing. By the time we realized the consequences of relaxing our
efforts in combating the drug problem, the fix had become much more
complicated and difficult. Drug abuse and trafficking was on the rise
again.
Between the early 1970s and the early 1990s, political, regional insur-
gent, revolutionary and even terrorist groups began to use illegal drug traf-
fic to finance their activities and as a weapon against their enemies. The
Sendero Luminoso of Peru, the FARC, ELN and M-19 of Colombia, the
Taliban and Al Qae'da all became involved to some extent in illegal drug
trafficking.5 Traditional drug traffickers in Colombia, Mexico and South-
east Asia became more violent. Lines between revolutionaries, insurgents,
terrorists, and drug traffickers became blurred, indistinct, and confusing.
There are many examples where these lines become blurred.
For instance, in Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionairos de
Colombia (FARC), the Ejercito de Liberation National (ELN), and the M-19
all originated as ideological groups. They had traditionally stayed away
from drug trafficking, relying on other means to finance their activities.
Yet, over the years, all of these groups utilized drug trafficking for income.
Initial involvement was limited to taxing and protecting cocaine, but later
expanded to include refining, transporting, stockpiling and selling cocaine.
Colombian drug criminals began using terrorism, murdering thousands of
police and judicial officials in Colombia, kidnapping public officials, mur-
dering a presidential candidate, bombing public buildings, and even blow-
ing up a Colombian airliner that killed over 100 people.6 These acts
clearly amounted to terrorism.
In Peru, the Sendero Luminoso (the "Shining Path") has been involved
in the taxation and protection of drug trafficking since the early 1980s.
The Shining Path has murdered hundreds of public officials, mostly police
and armed forces personnel. In 1994, the DEA lost five Special Agents in
an airplane crash in the foothills of the Andes Mountains near Santa Lucia,
cious nature of some of their public shootouts." See Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War
on Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1305, 1402
n. 489 (1983).
4. Transcript, There Not Saying "No," Online Newshour, available at http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/august96/teen.drugabuse-8-20.html (Aug. 20,
1996).
5. Information generally on these and other terrorist organizations is available
online at http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/ftolist.htm.
6. See generally Richard L. Fricker, A Judiciary Under Fire: In Bogota, Bullets and
Hard Questions about U.S. Drug Policies, 76 A.B.A. J. 54 (Feb. 1990).
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Peru. Initial reports stated that the Shining Path had downed the aircraft
with gunfire. However, subsequent investigation revealed the aircraft had
flown into an unfamiliar mountain valley, was unable to maneuver out, and
crashed near the base of the steep canyon wall. I went to the site along with
other personnel from the DEA, and the Peruvian and U.S. armies. Peruvian
pilots flew us in Russian helicopters courageously and flawlessly to the
crash site. Sadly, when we reached the crash site we learned all five Special
Agents aboard had died instantly in the crash. For the entire three days we
were at the crash site, U.S. and Peruvian army personnel monitored com-
munications that identified a party of Shining Path approaching on foot to
assault our position as retribution against U.S. and Peruvian success in
wiping out coca processing sites. The Peruvian government arrested the
head of the Shining Path several years ago, and the organization disap-
peared. However, the Shining Path appears to be making a comeback, and
is expected to become more active.
In Mexico, drug trafficking groups have long been involved in kidnap-
ping, torture and murder, along with the assassination and intimidation of
public officials and citizens alike. These groups, who even killed a Catho-
lic cardinal, have no political agenda. However, their terrorist acts have the
same effect as politically motivated terrorists: they render political, judicial,
economic and commercial institutions ineffective, and destabilize the gov-
ernment and the economy.
In Southeast Asia, the Shan United Army and the United Wa State
Army maintained control of their drug empires largely through violence
and intimidation, sometimes politically motivated and other times solely
financially motivated.7 In Southwest Asia and the Middle East, it is gener-
ally accepted and fairly well documented that the Taliban and al Qae'da
derived profits from illegal drug trafficking.8 U.S. authorities began track-
ing Osama bin Ladin's involvement in drugs in 1998. The United States
has had difficulty accurately determining the extent of bin Laden and al
Qae'da's business because of their methods of operation. However, it is
clear bin Laden used drugs as a weapon to try to destroy Western culture
and to finance his terror organization. The Taliban allowed opium produc-
tion to increase dramatically in Afghanistan under their rule. Moreover,
they derived significant income from it. Even the Taliban's ban on opium
cultivation a few years ago was largely a sham maneuver to attempt to shed
their international image as a drug producing state. In reality, prior to the
cultivation ban, huge quantities of opium had been stockpiled in order to
minimize any negative impact on income from the reduced opium produc-
tion.9 Additionally, profits from drug trafficking were accompanied by a
7. Information on these paramilitary organizations involved in heroin trafficking is
available online at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/ongoing/narco-terrorism.html. See also
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para.
8. International Information Programs, Text: DEA Administrator Testifies on Taliban
and Drug Trafficking, U.S. Department of State, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topi-
cal/global/drugs/O110302.htm (Oct. 3, 2001).
9. Id. (stating "up to 60% of each year's opium crop has traditionally been stored
for future sale .... ").
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convenient side-effect for al Qae'da. The illegal heroin traffic immensely
harmed Western societies who suffered from destructive effects of
increased drug addiction.
When speaking of narco-terrorism, we cannot afford to overlook its
effects in cities, towns, and neighborhoods right here in the United Sates.
Drug related violence plagues too many communities and violent drug
gangs terrorize too many good decent citizens on a daily basis in their own
neighborhoods. A few years ago, as Administrator of the DEA, I visited a
neighborhood in Philadelphia referred to as "The Badlands." 1° I heard hor-
rifying stories from residents about drug traffickers and addicts commit-
ting rapes, muggings, assaults, murders, robberies, and burglaries. I was
not naive after thirty-plus years in law enforcement, but I could not imagine
living with my family in those conditions. Later, at home, I came to tears
as I told my own family of the experience. This terrorism is every bit as
real and horrifying to the citizens in those communities as the World Trade
Center and Pentagon images are to the nation.
When one considers these facts together, it is easier to see the connec-
tion between drugs and terror and understand the meaning of the term
"narco-terrorism." In a very large sense the domestic drug problem aids
terrorism. Addicts poison themselves and drug traffickers create crime
and violence and immeasurable other ills in our society. In turn, terrorists
use profits to murder even more of us, and forever change the world in
which we live.
We must now consider what the future holds. Not only for security
against terrorism, but for our struggle against the tragedy of drug abuse,
and the crime and violence that accompany drug trafficking. These issues
are inextricably linked. They are linked because violence is terrorism,
whether an airplane is hijacked or an elderly woman is mugged. They are
linked because terrorists and drug traffickers are often'the same people, or
at least closely associated. They are linked because drug trafficking
finances terrorism. They are linked because techniques used to evade
authorities are almost identical in drug trafficking and terrorism. Drug
traffickers' criminal methodology is applicable to terrorists, and vice-versa.
For those reasons we cannot have measurable success against terrorism
without measurable success against drug abuse and drug. trafficking. Over
the long term,, we will be successful in driving terrorist organizations even
more underground. We will be successful in denying terrorists state spon-
sorship to the degree that they now enjoy. As those things happen, ter-
rorists will seek to derive increased amounts of financing through other
means, the most important of which is likely to be drug trafficking.
The American people and our elected and appointed leaders need to
know that illegal drug trafficking feeds terrorism, just as it feeds crime and
10. Referring to Philadelphia's East Division neighborhoods of Kensington and
Fairhill, an area that once thrived but has been overrun by drug dealers, especially those
selling heroin. See Andrea Fine, Philadelphia Launches Dragnet to Rid the 'Badlands' of
Drugs, The Christian Science Monitor, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/
1998/07/07/p3s2/htm (July 7, 1998).
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violence in our communities, and destroys the families and lives of individ-
ual drug abusers. More importantly, we need to act on that knowledge.
Law enforcement alone is not the answer to the problems of drugs or ter-
ror. Aggressive coordinated programs of public awareness, education, pre-
vention, civic action, corporate involvement, along with aggressive use of
law enforcement and the criminal justice system are essential if we are to
prevail over terrorism and the drug epidemic. Just as these methods suc-
ceeded in reducing drug usage by half between the late 1970s and the early
1990s, they can and will work in the 21st century.
